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In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held, six to three, that the federal crime of knowingly providing 
“material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”2 is 
constitutional, at least as applied to the particular forms of support 
that the plaintiffs sought to provide.3 This essay examines the legal 
and constitutional issues arising in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project from a comparative perspective and, in particular, in light of 
developments in the United Kingdom and in European law. Part I 
begins with a brief overview of counter-terrorism law in the UK. Part 
II examines the role played specifically by criminal law in the UK’s 
struggle against terrorism. Part III examines the aspects of UK and 
European counter-terrorism law, which most sharply reflect on the 
issues arising in Holder. 
The Holder plaintiffs, two U.S. citizens and six domestic 
organizations, wished to support the lawful and nonviolent activities 
of two groups that the Secretary of State had designated as “foreign 
terrorist organizations”: namely, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These groups aim 
to establish independent states, respectively, for Kurds in Turkey and 
for Tamils in Sri Lanka. Both groups engage in political and 
humanitarian activities, but both groups also have committed terrorist 
attacks, some of which have harmed U.S. citizens.4 
 
 * John Millar Professor of Public Law, University of Glasgow, UK. 
 1. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2010). 
 3. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2720 (The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Breyer filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined.). 
 4. Id. at 2713. 
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Material support is legislatively defined to include “any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service . . . , training, expert advice or 
assistance . . . ,” among other matters.5 The plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of the material support provision on two grounds: 
first that it was impermissibly vague, contrary to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and second that it violated their 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association.6 The 
plaintiffs in Holder wished to train PKK members to use international 
law to resolve disputes peacefully; they wished to teach PKK 
members to petition the United Nations and other representative 
bodies for relief; and they wished to engage in political advocacy on 
behalf of Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka.7 
The Supreme Court was unanimous that the first basis of the 
plaintiffs’ case must fail. The relevant legislative terms were held 
easily to satisfy the test laid down in United States v. Williams8 that a 
statute is not unconstitutionally vague if “a person of ordinary 
intelligence” is given “fair notice of what is prohibited . . . .”9 The 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment arguments, however, divided the Court. 
The majority emphasized that 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B10 does not prohibit 
the independent advocacy of a cause that is shared by a foreign 
terrorist organization; what it prohibits is support (as defined) for 
such a group.11 On this interpretation, the plaintiffs were permitted 
under the statute to say anything they liked.12 Support was 
criminalized under section 2339B because Congress had found that 
“foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted 
by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an 
organization facilitates that conduct.”13 In the Court’s opinion, this 
view was justified by the record: 
 
Material support meant to “promot[e] peaceable, lawful conduct” . 
. . can further terrorism by foreign groups in multiple ways. 
 
 5. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010). 
 6. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2714. 
 7. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180–84 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 8. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
 9. Id. at 304. 
 10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2010). 
 11. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2728 (emphasis added). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 
Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996). 
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“Material support” is a valuable resource by definition. Such 
support frees up other resources within the organization that may 
be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to 
foreign terrorist groups – legitimacy that makes it easier for those 
groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds – all of 
which facilitate more terrorist attacks.14 
 
Justice Breyer dissented on this point, stating that he could not 
agree that the “Constitution permits the Government to prosecute 
the plaintiffs criminally for engaging in coordinated teaching and 
advocacy furthering the designated organizations’ lawful political 
objectives.”15 The dissent argued that 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B was 
required to be interpreted such that it included a mens rea 
requirement, as follows: 
 
[T]he defendant would have to know or intend (1) that he is 
providing support or resources, (2) that he is providing that 
support to a foreign terrorist organization, and (3) that he is 
providing support that is material, meaning (4) that his support 
bears a significant likelihood of furthering the organization’s 
terrorist ends.16 
 
The dissent would have remanded the cases before the Court so 
that lower courts could have applied this reading of section 2339B to 
the plaintiffs’ proposed activities.17 The dissent’s interpretative stance 
is addressed further at the end of this essay. 
I. COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Configuring the justice and the fairness of counter-terrorism 
legislation has been among the highest profile problems of 
constitutional law in the United Kingdom since the turn of the new 
century. This is not because either terrorism or counter-terrorism is 
new to the United Kingdom: unlike the United States, the UK 
 
 14. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2725. 
 15. Id. at 2731. 
 16. Id. at 2740–41. 
 17. Id. at 2742. Note, Holder resolved two consolidated cases—Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project (No. 08-1498) and Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder (No. 09-89), both of which 
addressed the scope of section 2339B.  
DO NOT DELETE 10/28/2010  3:09:04 PM 
84 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE [VOL. 6:81 
possessed considerable experience of having to deal with terrorism 
(principally in connection with Northern Ireland) long before 9/11. 
Rather, it is the sheer quantity of counter-terrorism measures that are 
now in force in the UK and, in particular, the novelty of a number of 
these measures, which have proven problematic. The difficulties have 
been compounded by the fact that when courts in the UK are 
grappling with constitutional and legal issues, they must take into 
account both the UK’s own domestic law and the law of the 
European Union, as well as the relevant case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Both the EU courts (now known as the 
European Court of Justice and the General Court)18 and the Council 
of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights enjoy a growing 
influence in the area of counter-terrorism.19 
The modern story of the UK’s peacetime counter-terrorist 
legislation dates from 1974 when, in response to a series of IRA pub 
bombings, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1974 (1974 Act) was passed.20 The 1974 Act listed the IRA as a 
“proscribed organization” and made it a criminal offense to belong to, 
to profess to belong to, or to solicit or invite financial or other support 
for, a proscribed organization.21 
The 1974 Act was quickly supplemented with further counter-
terrorism legislation, notably the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) (Consolidation) Act 1978.22 Despite the words “temporary 
provisions” appearing in the title of the 1974 Act, the legislation was 
frequently renewed. By the late 1990s it had become the 
government’s view that, despite the apparent successes of the 
Northern Irish peace process, permanent counter-terrorist legislation 
 
 18. These are the names used by the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in December 
2009. Before Lisbon the EU’s courts were known as the European Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance. 
 19. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) are frequently confused for each other, but they are separate entities which enforce 
different legal regimes (EU law on the one hand, the European Convention on Human Rights 
on the other). The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a creation not of the 
European Union but of the separate organization, the Council of Europe. The role of the ECJ 
within UK law is determined by the European Communities Act 1972; the role of the ECtHR 
within UK law is determined by the Human Rights Act 1998. For a full account, see COLIN 
TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION ch. 5 (7th ed. 
2011). 
 20. See David Bonner, Responding to Crisis: Legislating against Terrorism, 122 L.Q. R. 602 
(2006). 
 21. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, ch. 56, § 1 (U.K.). 
 22. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Repealed 27.8.1991), ch. 5 (U.K.). 
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would be required, not specifically for Northern Ireland but for the 
whole of the United Kingdom. The result was the Terrorism Act 
2000.23 Still in force, this substantial piece of legislation was designed 
to be a comprehensive code of the UK’s counter-terrorism law. It 
provides the legal definition of terrorism used in UK law; it makes 
extensive provisions concerning proscribed organizations; it extends 
the criminal law to deal with a number of specific terrorist offenses; 
and it confers extended powers on the police, as well as legislating for 
a range of other matters.24 
The Terrorism Act 2000 did not, however, long remain a 
comprehensive code of the UK’s counter-terrorism law. Within a few 
weeks of 9/11, Parliament had passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 200125 and, in the years since, the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005,26 the Terrorism Act 2006,27 and the Counter-terrorism Act 
200828 have been added. The quantity of this law is staggering, but so 
too are some of the powers it confers. Let us take just one example: 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 created a new scheme of 
“control orders.” Control orders are coercive orders that may be 
placed on an individual where the Secretary of State (a) has 
“reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been 
involved in terrorism-related activity” and (b) “considers that it is 
necessary . . . to make a control order imposing obligations on that 
individual.”29 Control orders may be draconian in their effects, 
imposing lengthy curfews, grave restrictions on freedom of movement 
and extraordinary interferences with an individual’s private, social, 
and family life. No criminal offense need be committed before a 
control order may be made, and the courts have held that control 
orders, despite their gravity and severity, are not criminal sanctions; 
they are said to be preventative rather than punitive.30 
 
 23. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, §§ 1–131, schs. 1–15 (U.K.). 
 24. For a detailed commentary, see HELEN FENWICK, CIVIL RIGHTS: NEW LABOUR, 
FREEDOM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ch. 3 (2000). 
 25. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ch. 24 (U.K.). 
 26. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ch. 2 (U.K.) 
 27. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
 28. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, ch. 28 (U.K.). 
 29. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ch. 2, § 2(1). 
 30. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440. 
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II. TERRORISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
One may ask, why is any of this law necessary? Terrorism is a 
crime (in fact, and as we shall shortly see, it is many crimes). Given 
this, why does the state not simply rely on the criminal law to counter-
terrorism? If there is sufficient evidence of involvement in terrorism 
to justify a control order, or to justify deportation, surely there is 
sufficient evidence to prosecute? Those convicted of terrorist offenses 
are going to suffer not merely from the inconveniences of being 
placed under a control order, or of being deported. They are going to 
serve long terms of imprisonment. Would this not be a more secure 
way of protecting the public? 
The United Kingdom, like the United States, has tried to find ways 
of allowing the criminal law to play a greater role in countering 
terrorism. The British government routinely claims that criminal 
prosecution is its preferred means, but it seems it is not always 
possible to prosecute. For one thing, the criminal standard of proof is 
higher than the rather low threshold of “reasonable suspicion,” which 
is sufficient for a control order. For another, the rules as to disclosure 
in the law of criminal justice may be more burdensome on the state 
(and more generous to the defendant) than is the case in civil matters. 
And, the government is extremely reluctant to disclose material that 
risks revealing the extent of the Security Service’s and Secret 
Intelligence Service’s knowledge, the sources the Services rely upon, 
their working methods, and the like. 
It may be objected that there is a fundamental flaw in seeking to 
rely on the criminal law as a major component of counter-terrorism 
strategy. This is that criminal offenses are generally prosecuted after 
they have been committed, and the government’s principal role in 
countering terrorism ought to be to prevent it, rather than to wait for 
an atrocity to kill and maim before seeking prosecutions. Such an 
objection would be misconceived, however, given the extraordinary 
array of offenses which now exist in relation to terrorism. The two 
most important statutes here are the Terrorism Act 2000 (2000 Act) 
and the Terrorism Act 2006 (2006 Act).31 The former continues the 
scheme of proscribed organizations (which dates back to the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974). When the 2000 Act was passed, 
fourteen organizations were listed as being proscribed, all of them 
 
 31. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, §§ 1–38, schs. 1–3 (U.K.). 
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connected with Northern Ireland. Since then, forty-six further 
organizations have been added, all of them alleged to be connected to 
international terrorism. Both the PKK and the LTTE (the two 
organizations with which Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project was 
concerned) are included on the list of proscribed organizations.32 
Sections 11–12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 make it an offense to 
“belong[] or profess[] to belong to” or “to invite[] support for” a 
proscribed organization.33 It is an offense under section 15 of the 2000 
Act for anyone to invite a person to provide money or other property, 
intending or having reasonable cause to suspect “that it may be used[] 
for the purposes of terrorism.”34 Training in the making or use of 
firearms, explosives or certain other weapons is prohibited by section 
54 of the 2000 Act.35 The offense of inviting support for a proscribed 
organization (section 12) is similar to the provisions at issue 
concerning material support considered by the Supreme Court in 
Holder. 
Additional criminal offenses were created by sections 57 and 58 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000. Under section 57 of the Act it is an offense to 
“possess[] an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that [the] possession is for a purpose connected with . . . 
terrorism.”36 It is a defense for a person charged with an offense under 
this section to prove that his possession was not for a purpose 
connected with terrorism.37 The offense in section 57 is a serious 
crime: a conviction may result in a sentence of fifteen years 
imprisonment.38 The offense consists of two elements, both of which 
must be proved by the state to the criminal standard (“beyond 
reasonable doubt”) in order to secure a conviction. That is to say, the 
state must first prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
 
 32. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, sch. 2 (U.K.). On the criteria for proscription and de-
proscription, see infra note 23. Note that in the UK both domestic and foreign organizations 
may be proscribed. In this regard, the statement in Holder that “[w]e also do not suggest that 
Congress could extend the same prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic 
organizations” is striking. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010). 
 33. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, §§ 11(1), 12(1)(a). In this respect it appears there is a 
difference between proscription in the UK and designation as a foreign terrorist organization in 
the U.S.: 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B does not criminalize mere membership in a foreign terrorist 
organization. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718 (“Section 2339B does not criminalize mere 
membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization.”). 
 34. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11,  § 15(1)(b). 
 35. Id. at § 54. 
 36. Id. at § 57. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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was in possession of an article, and the state must then prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the circumstances of the defendant’s possession 
of the article gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that he possessed it 
for a purpose connected with terrorism.39 Even if the state can prove 
both elements of the offense to the criminal standard of proof, this 
may nonetheless not result in a conviction, for the defendant may be 
able to prove that, notwithstanding any reasonable suspicion to the 
contrary, his possession of the article was not in fact for terrorist 
purposes.40 Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offense 
to “collect[] or make[] a record of information of a kind likely to be 
useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.”41 
Under this section it is also an offense to possess a document or 
record containing such information.42 An offense under this section is 
punishable by up to ten years imprisonment.43 It is a defense for a 
person charged under section 58 to prove that he had a “reasonable 
excuse for his action or possession.”44 
The reach of the criminal law was further extended under the 
Terrorism Act 2006. Under section 1 of the 2006 Act it is an offense to 
publish a statement by which a person either “intends members of the 
public to be directly or indirectly encouraged . . . to commit, prepare 
or instigate acts of terrorism” or is reckless as to whether the 
statement will have such an effect.45 Section 1 further provides that 
every statement which “glorifies the commission or preparation 
(whether in the past, in the future, or generally) of such acts” is 
expressed to fall within the scope of the offense.46 It is to be noted that 
this offense can be committed without any person in fact being 
encouraged or induced to engage in an act of terrorism. The 
maximum sentence for a conviction under this section is seven years 
imprisonment.47 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. The construction of the section 57 offense caused some problems, with courts 
finding it difficult to establish which burdens of proof fell on which parties; the construction of 
the offense summarized here is that which was laid down by the House of Lords in the leading 
case of R v. G [2009] UKHL 13, [2010] 1 A.C. 43. 
 41. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 58(1)(a). 
 42. Id. at § 58(1)(b). 
 43. Id. at § 58(4)(a). 
 44. Id. at § 58(3). 
 45. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, § 1(1)(b)(ii) (U.K.). 
 46. Id. at § 1(2)(a). 
 47. Id. at § 1(7)(a). 
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This is an offense that is designed to have an impact on free 
speech. The offense is likely to survive any challenge brought in the 
British courts on the basis of Article 10 ECHR, which protects 
freedom of expression.48 Under the ECHR, freedom of expression is 
not an absolute right, but is qualified. Interferences with freedom of 
expression will be lawful if they are prescribed by law; if they are 
proportionate; and if they serve some listed public interest, such as 
safeguarding national security or public safety. These tests are likely 
to be satisfied with regard to this offense. Even if the offense survives 
judicial scrutiny, prosecutors bringing charges under section 1 must 
ensure that their use of the provision is proportionate. Any 
disproportionate use of the offense would be liable to be struck down 
as incompatible with Article 10: such an outcome would render a 
particular prosecution unlawful, but it would not affect the legislation 
itself. 
Further offenses were created by sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006. Section 5 makes it a crime to engage “in any conduct in 
preparation for” committing, or assisting another person to commit, 
an act of terrorism.49 This offense is punishable by imprisonment for 
life.50 Under section 6 it is an offense either to provide or to receive 
“instruction or training . . . for or in connection with the commission 
or preparation of acts of terrorism.”51 The maximum sentence for this 
offense is ten years imprisonment.52 
III. CRIMINALIZING SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM 
As noted in Part II, under section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 it 
is a criminal offense in the United Kingdom to invite support for a 
 
 48. To my knowledge, no such challenge has been attempted. 
 49. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, § 5(1). 
 50. Id. at § 5(3). 
 51. Id. at § 6(1). 
 52. Id. at § 6(5). A quarterly report is published by the government giving overall numbers 
of terrorism charges and convictions (the published numbers do not give an offense-by-offense 
breakdown). In 2008, twenty-nine charges were laid under the UK’s terrorism legislation, and 
there were twelve convictions. In 2009, the figures were twelve and two respectively. Since 9/11 
there have been 266 charges laid under the terrorism legislation, resulting in 122 convictions. See 
HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN, OPERATION OF POLICE POWERS UNDER THE 
TERRORISM ACT 2000 AND SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION: ARRESTS, OUTCOMES AND STOPS AND 
SEARCHES, http:// rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/hosb1010.pdf (June 10, 2010). These figures 
do not include those arrested for a terrorism offense but charged with and/or convicted of an 
offense under other (non-terrorist) legislation. If these cases are added, the overall number of 
terrorism-related arrests in the UK since 9/11 is 1,817, leading to 402 terrorism-related charges 
and 235 terrorism-related convictions. 
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proscribed organization. In more detail, section 12 is in the following 
terms: 
(1) A person commits an offence if— 
(a) he invites support for a proscribed organization, and 
(b) the support is not, or is not restricted to, the provision of 
money or other property (within the meaning of section 15). 
(2) A person commits an offence if he arranges, manages or assists 
in arranging or managing a meeting which he knows is— 
(a) to support a proscribed organization, 
(b) to further the activities of a proscribed organization, or 
(c) to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to 
belong to a proscribed organization. 
(3) A person commits an offence if he addresses a meeting and the 
purpose of his address is to encourage support for a proscribed 
organization or to further its activities. 
  . . . 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be 
liable— 
(a) . . . to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, to 
a fine or to both . . .53 
There has been very little litigation with regard to this provision. 
There has been no direct challenge to it in the way in which the 
“material support” provisions of U.S. law were challenged in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project. This may be explained in part by the 
different litigation strategies that seem to be favored in the U.S. and 
the UK. In the United Kingdom, it is rare for a legislative provision to 
be challenged in the abstract. It is far more common for a party to 
challenge the way in which a provision is applied to it. 
The most important case in connection with section 12 is Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v. Lord Alton of Liverpool.54 This 
case was brought by an all-party group of thirty-five parliamentarians 
 
 53. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 12. 
 54. Lord Alton of Liverpool v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Proscribed 
Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC), Nov. 30, 2007, ¶¶ 340, 359, available at http:// 
www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/poac/Documents/outcomes/PC022006PMOIFINALJUDGMENT.pd
f (last visited Sept. 21, 2010). 
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who wished to arrange meetings at which support could be 
encouraged for the People’s Mojahadeen Organization of Iran 
(PMOI).55 PMOI was a proscribed organization, but the 
parliamentarians believed that the organization was no longer 
involved in terrorist activity and had become a peaceful political party 
advocating regime change in Iran.56 Unless PMOI was de-proscribed, 
the parliamentarians would risk prosecution under section 12 were 
they to hold such meetings of support.57 PMOI applied to the 
Secretary of State to be de-proscribed, but the Secretary of State 
refused its application.58 Lord Alton and his fellow parliamentarians 
sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to de-
proscribe PMOI.59 
Such cases are heard by the Proscribed Organizations Appeal 
Commission (POAC), a statutory tribunal established under the 
Terrorism Act 2000.60 POAC ruled that the Secretary of State’s refusal 
to de-proscribe the People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of Iran was 
unlawful.61 POAC’s decision was subsequently upheld on the 
Secretary of State’s unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Appeal.62 
An organization may be proscribed only if the Secretary of State 
“believes that it is concerned in terrorism.”63 It was common ground 
in the PMOI case that the decision of the Secretary of State involved 
a two-part analysis: first, he had to determine, in the light of all the 
relevant evidence, whether he believed the organization was 
“concerned in terrorism.”64 Second, if he did so believe, he then had to 
consider whether or not his discretion to proscribe should be 
exercised.65 It was also common ground that at the first stage the 
Secretary of State had to have reasonable grounds for believing that 
 
 55. Id. at ¶¶ 19–20. 
 56. Id. at ¶¶  22–23. 
 57. Id. at ¶ 20. 
 58. Id. at ¶ 31. 
 59. Id. at ¶¶ 32–37. 
 60. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 5 (U.K.). 
 61. Lord Alton, POAC, ¶¶ 340, 359. 
 62. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Lord Alton of Liverpool, [2008] EWCA Civ 443, 
[2008] 1 W.L.R. 2341.  
 63. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 3(4). The Terrorism Act 2006 added organizations which 
are engaged in “the unlawful glorification of . . . terrorism” to those which are “concerned in 
terrorism” for the purposes of the Secretary of State’s powers as to proscription. Terrorism Act 
2006, ch. 11, § 21 (U.K.). 
 64. Lord Alton, POAC, ¶ 67. 
 65. Id. at ¶ 68. 
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an organization is concerned in terrorism.66 POAC’s function 
therefore was “to assess whether the grounds relied on were 
reasonable in the light of all of the material before it.”67 The parties 
were not agreed as to how POAC should undertake this task. The 
appellants argued that, as various parties’ human rights were directly 
in issue, POAC should adopt an intense standard of review; in 
particular, they argued, POAC should assure itself that the Secretary 
of State’s decision was based on “an acceptable assessment of the 
facts.”68 The Secretary of State argued that human rights 
considerations entered only at the second stage, meaning that the first 
stage should be reviewed using only a low standard, such that POAC 
should intervene only if the Secretary of State had done something 
outrageous.69 POAC ruled that its function was “to subject both stages 
of the decision making process to intense scrutiny.”70 POAC stated: 
 
It is not our function to substitute our view for the decision of the 
Secretary of State. . . . It is our function, however, to scrutini[z]e all 
of the material before us carefully and to examine its strengths and 
weaknesses to see if it provides reasonable grounds for the 
Secretary of State’s belief [that the organization in question is 
“concerned in terrorism”]. . . . 
  . . . . 
 
We accept that appropriate deference has to be given to the 
Secretary of State in, for example, assessments of national security 
or on foreign policy issues . . . . We do not accept, however, that we 
can or should simply defer to the Secretary of State (or indeed the 
views of the intelligence services or his advisers) on all matters. It 
depends on the nature of the evidence or material being 
considered. Much of the material before this Commission relevant 
to the First Stage of the decision-making process is essentially 
factual and is of a type that Courts are familiar with assessing in 
ordinary litigation.71 
 
 
 66. Id. at ¶ 67. 
 67. Id. at ¶ 78. 
 68. Id. at ¶ 79 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. at ¶ 82. 
 70. Id. at ¶ 113. 
 71. Id. at ¶¶ 116, 119. 
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Applying this standard of review, POAC devoted seventy pages of 
its judgment to a detailed analysis of the evidence as to whether 
PMOI was or was not at the material time concerned in terrorism.72 It 
concluded, contrary to the view of the Secretary of State, that it was 
not.73 POAC criticized the approach adopted by the Secretary of 
State: rather than focusing on the question of whether PMOI was 
concerned in terrorism at the material time (that is to say, at the time 
when the Secretary of State made his decision to refuse to de-
proscribe the organization), he had focused instead on the rather 
different question of whether PMOI had done enough clearly and 
unequivocally to show that its former terrorist operations had come 
to a permanent end.74 The Secretary of State concluded that it had not, 
not least because insufficient time had elapsed to form a reasonable 
belief as to whether PMOI’s apparent cessation of terrorist activities 
would become permanent.75 POAC found, by contrast, that there was 
no evidence that PMOI possessed at the material time a “structure 
that was capable of carrying out or supporting terrorist acts”; that 
there was “no evidence of any attempt to ‘prepare’ for terrorism”; and 
that there was “no evidence of any encouragement to others to 
commit acts of terrorism.”76 From this it concluded that “the only 
belief that a reasonable decision maker could have honestly 
entertained” was that at the material time the PMOI was not 
concerned in terrorism and could therefore not lawfully be 
proscribed.77 
The Secretary of State appealed POAC’s decision to the Court of 
Appeal.78 His principal argument sought to attack POAC’s criticism of 
the way he had approached the question of de-proscription.79 His 
argument was as follows: that whether “PMOI was ‘concerned in 
terrorism’ depended critically on the intention of [PMOI’s leaders] as 
to its future conduct”; that “[d]etermining [such] future intention . . . 
 
 72. Id. at ¶¶ 134–325. 
 73. Id. at ¶ 325. 
 74. Id. at ¶¶ 302, 334. 
 75. See id. at ¶ 333 (“[C]an the period of [five] years in which no terrorist attacks have been 
claimed be regarded as providing strong/convincing evidence that PMOI has abandoned such 
methods?” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 76. Id. at ¶ 348. 
 77. Id. at ¶ 349. 
 78. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Lord Alton, [2008] EWCA Civ 443, [2008] 1 
W.L.R. 2341. 
 79. See id. at 2351 (“The critical ground of appeal is . . . [that POAC] should have shown 
deference to the Secretary of State’s decision.”). 
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was a matter of assessment or evaluation”; that in reviewing this 
matter POAC should have applied a lower standard of review and 
“should have shown deference to the Secretary of State’s decision”; 
and that, had POAC adopted such a standard, it should have found in 
favor of the Secretary of State.80 The Court of Appeal had little 
difficulty in rejecting this argument. It agreed with POAC that “an 
organisation that has no capacity to carry on terrorist activities and is 
taking no steps to acquire such capacity . . . cannot be said to be 
‘concerned in terrorism’” even if its leaders may have intended “to 
resort to terrorism in the future.”81 
A different perspective on the criminalization of support for 
terrorism may be gained from recent case law of the EU’s courts. The 
most important judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
this field thus far is its famous decision in Kadi v. Council.82 Kadi’s 
assets were frozen under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1267.83 Among other matters, UNSCR 1267 requires all states to 
“freeze the funds and other financial assets of individuals and entities 
. . . as designated” by a Sanctions Committee, established under 
UNSCR 1267 with the task of designating funds derived or generated 
from, and property owned or controlled by, the Taliban, Osama bin 
Laden or Al Qaida.84 Under Regulation 881/2002 the Council of 
Ministers (an institution of the European Union) decided that 
designations under UNSCR 1267 would be implemented within the 
European Union at EU level, rather than severally by the EU’s 
twenty-seven Member States. Article 2(1) of Regulation 881/2002 
provides that “[a]ll funds and economic resources belonging to, or 
owned or held by, a natural or legal person . . . designated by the 
Sanctions Committee and listed in [the Annex to the Regulation] 
shall be frozen.”85 Kadi was designated by the Sanctions Committee, 
he was added to the list in the Annex, and his assets in the EU were 
accordingly frozen under Article 2 of Regulation 881/2002.86 
Kadi brought legal proceedings in what is now the General Court 
(formerly the Court of First Instance), seeking annulment of the EC 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2355. 
 82. Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05 P, Kadi, Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6351. 
 83. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3. 
 84. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4. 
 85. Id. at ¶ 397. 
 86. Id. at ¶¶ 2–7. 
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Regulation as it applied to him.87 Among other matters, he claimed 
that his fundamental rights had been violatedspecifically, his right 
to be heard, his right to property, and his right to effective judicial 
protection.88 The General Court ruled that it could not review the 
legality of Regulation 881/2002 against the standards imposed by 
fundamental rights in EU law, as the measure simply applied in the 
EU decisions that were taken at UN level by the Security Council’s 
Sanctions Committee.89 While the Sanctions Committee might be 
bound by aspects of international law, it was not subject to EU law.90 
Kadi appealed to the Court of Justice, which allowed his appeal, 
ruling that Kadi’s right to be heard, his right to effective judicial 
protection, and his right to property had been violated.91 
The ECJ’s statements in Kadi about the importance of 
fundamental rights within the EU legal order are striking, but it 
should be borne in mind that, even after the judgment, Kadi’s assets 
remained frozen.92 The Court gave the Council three months in which 
to comply with the requirements of the judgment—that is, three 
months in which to offer Kadi some form of hearing compatible with 
EU law.93 Kadi duly received narrative summaries of the reasons 
provided by the UN Sanctions Committee as to why his assets should 
be frozen and he was able to comment on them.94 His comments were 
considered by the EU’s authorities, who concluded that “the listing of 
Mr Kadi is justified for reasons of his association with the Al Qaida 
network.”95 The European Commission therefore decided that Kadi’s 
assets should remain frozen.96 
Kadi brought fresh proceedings in the General Court, challenging 
the lawfulness of this decision. On September 30, 2010 that court 
ruled in Kadi’s favor, holding that “the mere fact of sending the 
applicant the summary of reasons cannot reasonably be regarded as 
 
 87. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 88. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 89. Id. at ¶ 18. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at ¶ 55. 
 92. See Commission Regulation 1190/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 322) 25 (EC) (“[T]he Court 
ordered the effects of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 to be maintained, so far as concerns Mr 
Kadi . . . for a period that may not exceed three months running from the date of delivery of the 
judgment.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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satisfying the requirements of a fair hearing and effective judicial 
protection.”97 The Court stated that “[i]t is essential that the applicant 
be shown the inculpatory evidence used against him . . . in such a way 
that he will have a fair opportunity to respond and to clear his 
name.”98 As Kadi had been shown nothing like this amount of 
information, his right to a fair hearing had not been respected, and the 
Commission’s decision that Kadi’s assets should remain frozen was 
unlawful. 
In a decision of the European Court of Justice99 that was handed 
down two months before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project, the ECJ appears to have made an 
important statement about the limits of counter-terrorism law in the 
European Union. The case is R (M) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury.100 Like 
Kadi, it is concerned with the freezing of terrorist assets under 
UNSCR 1267 and Regulation 881/2002.101 M’s husband was 
designated under UNSCR 1267, and, as a result, his assets in the EU 
were frozen under Regulation 881/2002.102 Certain welfare and social 
security payments were made to M.103 The question for the Court of 
Justice was whether these payments should be frozen.104 The relevant 
UK authority (HM Treasury) was of the view that the payments 
should be frozen, on the basis that they were caught by Article 2(2) of 
Regulation 881/2002, which provides that “[n]o funds shall be made 
available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of”105 a person 
designated by the Sanctions Committee.106 The Court of Justice 
disagreed with the view of HM Treasury. The Court emphasized that 
the funds in question were used by M to meet the essential needs of 
the household and ruled that, in these circumstances, the benefit in 
kind that a designated person might indirectly derive from such 
welfare payments did not compromise the objective pursued by 
 
 97. Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex LEXIS 825 (Sept. 30, 2010). 
 98. Id., para. 158. 
 99. Case C-340/08, R (M) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ 
(search case number C-340/08; then follow link to judgment of Apr. 29, 2010). 
 100. Case C-340/08, R (M) v. HM Treasury, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search 
case number C-340/08; then follow link to judgment of Apr. 29, 2010). 
 101. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2. 
 102. Id. at ¶¶ 23–25. 
 103. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 104. Id. at ¶ 32. 
 105. Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9, art. 2, ¶ 2 (EC). 
 106. Case C-340/08, ¶¶ 33–37. 
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Regulation 881/2002.107 That objective was “to stop designated persons 
gaining access to economic or financial resources that . . . they could 
use to support terrorist activities.”108 Thus, funds which such persons 
could not so use were not caught by the terms of Regulation 
881/2002.109 
Echoes of a similar, purposive, reading may be found in Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Holder. Justice Breyer stated that he 
would read the material support provisions as “criminalizing First-
Amendment-protected pure speech and association only where the 
defendant knows or intends that those activities will assist the 
organization’s unlawful terrorist actions.”110 As we have seen, no such 
purposive limitations are found in the United Kingdom’s various 
criminal offenses with regard to proscribed organizations and the like. 
It may be that, under the influence of EU law, such is the direction in 
which the UK’s counter-terrorism law may travel in the future. As 
things stand, however, the United Kingdom’s jurisprudence on the 
criminalization of support for terrorism is much closer to that held 
constitutionally permissible by the majority of the Supreme Court in 
Holder. 
 
 107. Id. at ¶¶ 60–63. 
 108. Id. at ¶ 62. 
 109. Id. at ¶ 63. 
 110. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2740 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
